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Abstract
This research hopes to answer a few questions. Do macroeconomic variables, specifically unemployment,
government debt, and growth levels drive Spain’s SDRP? Of what magnitude is that influence? What impact
did the Great Recession have on the variables’ magnitude of influence? This research will use time series
analysis to answer these questions.
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I.  Introduction
 Since the Great Recession hit the 
United States, and the rest of  the world, in 
2008 and 2009, recovery has been slow. Spain 
in particular has had a hard time adjusting to 
the unstable economy, earning them a bailout 
of  nearly €37 billion in November 2012. Four 
of  its weakest banks are to be completely 
restructured, hoping to cut their balance sheets 
by over 60% by 2017. As the country stands 
now, unemployment is at 27% and it is said to 
be going through its second recession in three 
years (Thompson, 2012). Though it’s too early 
to analyze the effects of  the bailout, analyzing 
Spain’s economy can still help answer 
important questions about the recession 
as well as Spain’s future. It is important to 
analyze larger and influential countries in the 
European Union, like Spain, as they can often 
help explain the greater effects on the world 
economy as a whole.
 Five years after the recession and 
following an EU bailout, one wonders if  
Spain’s debt is a safe investment or one that 
carries more risk. One way to measure this is 
the Sovereign Debt Risk Premium, or SDRP. 
A Risk Premium is the expected return on 
an investment based on the level of  risk 
that it carries, meaning that the Sovereign 
Debt Risk Premium is the expected return 
on investing in Spain’s Sovereign Debt. The 
higher the risk, the higher the yield needs 
to be in order to attract investment. To find 
Spain’s SDRP, Spain will be compared to 
an economically stable country, in this case, 
Germany. Germany is the third largest 
economy in the world and is often used as the 
“control” variable in economic tests of  EU 
countries’ well-being. An example is Iglesias 
et al. (2003) which, similar to this study, uses 
Germany as a control when testing Spain’s 
economic indicators. Since October 2011 
Germany’s interest rate has not been higher 
than 2%, while Spain’s has been as high as 
6.8%. To put those numbers into perspective, 
the United States’ interest rate has been about 
1% since 2011. Germany’s unemployment 
rate is currently at 7% (about the same as the 
United States), while Spain’s is at a staggering 
27%. Currently, Spain is still struggling with 
an interest rate of  4.5% (as of  August 2013); 
while simultaneously Germany’s interest rate 
is 1.7%. Because Germany and Spain are both 
part of  the European Union and have such 
polar economic standings, juxtaposing the 
two will yield the best results. To find Spain’s 
SDRP the yield of  the German government 
debt is subtracted from the yield of  the 
Spanish government debt.
 This research hopes to answer a few 
questions. Do macroeconomic variables, 
specifically unemployment, government 
debt, and growth levels drive Spain’s SDRP? 
Of  what magnitude is that influence? What 
impact did the Great Recession have on 
the variables’ magnitude of  influence? This 
research will use time series analysis to answer 
these questions.
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 The rest of  the paper is organized 
as follows: the next section is a literature 
review which discusses others’ contributions 
to this study and how this study intends to 
build on them, followed by the description of  
the data and methods that are used, the last 
two sections are the results of  the regression 
equation and the presentation of  the 
conclusions. Tables and Figures can be found 
in the Appendix at the end of  the paper.
II.  Literature Review
 This analysis will reveal whether or not 
the interest rate on Spanish debt is a function 
of  unemployment, real GDP growth rates, 
and government debt and how much influence 
those variables have. Similarly Jimenez-Martin 
et al. (2010) show how risk premiums affect 
exchange rates. The study finds that returns 
on exchange rates are a function of  volatility 
of  economic indicators and the perception 
by state-uncertainty. Groba et al. (2013) find 
that both the risk premium and the default 
components of  credit default swap spreads are 
partially explained by macroeconomic factors. 
Similarly, Schuknecht et al. (2009) analyze 
the bond spreads issued by 13 European 
countries. The sample period was from 1991 
to early 2005. They find that yield spreads 
over bonds depends significantly on indicators 
of  fiscal performance. These studies show how 
economic variables affect other kinds of  risk 
premiums. This study focusses specifically on 
the sovereign debt risk premium which should 
be similarly affected by macroeconomic 
indicators. These studies show that risk 
premiums can generally be explained by global 
and local macroeconomic factors, this study 
builds on them by attempting to find how 
significant specific economic factors are to the 
SDRP.
 The data used juxtaposes Germany 
and Spain before and after the financial crisis 
because of  Germany’s relative economic 
stability. Other literature on risk premiums 
finds that since the economic crisis at the end 
of  the last decade Germany has become an 
economic “safe haven” Bernoth et al. (2012). 
It is reasonable that juxtaposing Spain’s 
interest rate and other variables to Germany’s 
will yield more informative results about 
Spain’s stability. The research of  Bernoth et al. 
(2012) finds that after the financial crisis, bond 
yield spreads can still be largely explained on 
the basis of  economic principles. Similarly, 
this paper will show the magnitude of  effect 
the aforementioned variables have on Spain’s 
risk premium. 
 Bernoth et al. (2012) also find that 
German government bond yields are still 
below other government bond yields with 
better debt positions. They inferred that that 
bond yields do not appropriately reflect fiscal 
performance, which is contrary to popular 
belief. Schuknecht et al. (2009) state that 
because risk premiums have always been 
positively related to debt and deficits, that 
government bond yields are “signals of  the 
markets’ assessment of  the sustainability of  
fiscal policy”. A different study by Akemann 
et al. (2005) show that interest rates are 
inversely related to debt sustainability which 
is more relevant to this paper considering 
Spanish debt’s high risk premium of  late. 
The study shows that an increasing interest 
rate will eventually lead to a decrease in the 
demand for government bonds which often 
leads to default. This shows the importance of  
interest rates and risk premiums as economic 
indicators despite the findings of  Bernoth et 
al. (2012) regarding the ability of  bond yields 
to appropriately reflect fiscal performance.
 Iglesias et al. (2003) analyzes the 
evolution of  the French, German, and Spanish 
risk premium using a multivariate GARCH-M 
model of  the three countries. Using monthly 
data gathered from Datastream database 
and the bank of  Spain, they found the excess 
holding yields on the 3-month short-term 
interest rate relative to the 1-month short-
term interest rate in each country. They fit 
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a GARCH-M model to the series and using 
it the study finds that Spain’s risk premium 
was time-varying and was dependent on 
the volatility of  the German yield. So the 
evolution of  the Spanish interest rate before 
entering the EMU has been more influenced 
by uncertainty in the German economy than 
in the Spanish economy. This paper will use 
more current data (from immediately after this 
study) to show how Spain’s own economic 
indicators affect its interest rate and risk 
premium. It will show how Spain’s economy 
has evolved to the point where its interest rates 
rely less on Germany’s volatility and more on 
Spanish economic indicators.
II. Data and Methods
 This section describes the data, 
methods, and transformations used to analyze 
the SDRP. Four data series were used: Risk 
Premium (the difference between Spain’s 
and Germany’s yield of  government-issued 
bonds), Growth Gap (the difference between 
Spain’s and Germany’s GDP growth rates), 
Unemployment Differential (the difference 
between the growth rates of  the unemployed 
population in Spain and Germany), Debt 
Differential (the difference between the 
growth rates of  government debt in Spain and 
Germany). A dummy variable was also used 
to capture the change in market assessment 
of  sovereign debt risk after the 2008 financial 
crisis. Called “Dummy_2008”, it has a value 
of  0 before 2008 and 1 afterward. These 
data were gathered from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) database and the 
Eurostat database. The data sets are comprised 
of  quarterly data from quarter 1 of  1999 to 
quarter 2 of  2013. Some data existed for all 
of  1999 and quarter 2 of  2013, but it was 
not complete across all variables. The IMF 
is an international organization made up 
of  188 countries whose goal is worldwide 
economic prosperity. Their online database 
is based on worldwide economic surveillance 
overseen by the member countries. Similarly 
Eurostat is a Directorate-General of  the 
European Commission (the executive body 
of  the European Union). Eurostat’s database 
provides statistical information to the EU 
in an effort to promote the harmonization 
of  statistical methods across its member 
countries. This analysis would have benefitted 
from more frequent data, but only quarterly 
data was consistently available across all of  
the variables.
 From the IMF the following data for 
Spain and Germany was gathered: interest 
rates on government bonds in percents, 
unemployment and labor force in number 
of  people, and real gross domestic product 
in euros (adjusted for 2005 euro prices and 
seasonally adjusted). From Eurostat the two 
governments’ consolidated gross debt in euros 
based on current market prices were gathered. 
After gathering the data, it was transformed 
into the four datasets: Risk Premium, Growth 
Gap, Unemployment Differential, and Debt 
Differential.
 To find the Risk Premium, German 
bond interest rates were subtracted from 
Spanish bond interest rates. To find the 
Growth Gap the GDP growth rates were first 
found by taking the first order differences of  
the logarithms of  the countries’ respective 
GDPs. The German GDP growth rates 
were then subtracted from the Spanish GDP 
growth rates to find the Growth Gap. The 
Unemployment Differential was found by 
first taking the first order differences of  the 
logarithms of  each counties’ unemployed 
population and then subtracting Germany’s 
from Spain’s. Similarly the Debt Differential 
was found by first taking the first order 
differences of  the logarithms of  each counties’ 
consolidated gross debt and then subtracting 
Germany’s from Spain’s.
 The Sovereign Debt Risk Premium 
is the center of  this analysis because it is 
an oft-used economic indicator. Akemann 
(2005), for example, finds that the SDRP 
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is inversely related to a country’s ability to 
avoid default. SDRPs are often influenced 
by general macroeconomic factors like GDP 
growth, government debt, and unemployment. 
In fact, Groba (2013) finds that risk premiums 
are directly influenced by macroeconomic 
factors. Testing these specific variables against 
Spain’s SDRP shows the magnitude of  their 
influence. It is hypothesized that the Debt and 
Unemployment Differentials are positively 
related to the Risk Premium, as increases in 
all three variables tend to be associated with 
a worsening economic situation. It is also 
projected that the Risk Premium is positively 
related to the Growth Gap because a widening 
GDP growth gap implies general economic 
instability.
 Figure 1 is a graph, in levels, showing 
Spain’s SDRP over time. The data reveals 
three trends: the SDRP is stagnant from 
2000Q1 to 2008Q1, generally increasing from 
2008Q1 to 2012Q3, and decreasing from 
2012Q3 to 2013Q1. This accurately portrays 
Spain’s periods of  economic stability (before 
the 2008 financial crisis), instability (during 
the crisis), and recovery (after the bailout in 
November 2012) over the last 13 years. Figure 
1 indicates that the SDRP peaked in 2012Q3 
immediately before the bailout and after the 
bailout it shows a sharp decline in the SDRP 
that mirrors the increase from years previous.
 From this it can be inferred that the bailout 
of  nearly €37 billion in November 2012 
has already started to positively affect the 
economic stability of  Spain. Figure 2 shows 
all of  the datasets. The Unemployment Gap 
shows a general downward trend until around 
2006 when it begins to increase. It stays below 
5%, but after a sharp increase in 2008, due 
to the recession, it goes past 10% and in the 
years following it continues to increase. The 
November 2012 bailout doesn’t seem to show 
any effect on the unemployment gap as of  yet, 
but employment is bound to remain stagnant 
for longer than financial indicators. The 
Growth Gap shows some seasonal trends, but 
stays around 0.005% until dropping to around 
0% in 2006. It, too, spikes during the recession 
before finding a new normal at -0.01% in 
2009. Spain and Germany had similar levels 
of  growth until the recession where the 
numbers had an anomalous spike before 
showing the new normal where Spain’s growth 
level is consistently lower than Germany’s. 
The Debt Differential, similar to the Growth 
Gap, has seasonal trends that hover around 
0% to -0.01% before the 2008 recession spike 
to almost .08%. The Debt Differential then 
dips down to -0.06% in 2011, spikes the next 
quarter and continues in this fashion. After the 
recession the data becomes highly irregular, 
with many spikes and dips, never reaching a 
new normal. It can be inferred from this that 
the German debt was immediately affected 
by the recession and the Spanish debt took a 
few years to feel the same effects. There is a 
direct correlation between the Unemployment 
Differential and the Risk Premium, while 
the Debt Differential and the Growth Gap 
share only a simultaneous spike with the Risk 
Premium during the 2008 recession.
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimation 
was used with Eviews software to fit a model 
to the data in the following form:
III.  Results
 The first step to fitting a model to these 
series is finding their order of  integration. The 
tables in the appendix show the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots and the 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin tests 
for stationarity. These datasets were tested 
for stationary motion, or “stationarity”, in 
their mean and variance. Stationarity, or 
lack of  stationarity, can strongly influence 
the behavior and properties of  a series, and 
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without it, the estimated model cannot be 
accepted as an accurate portrayal of  the data. 
If  a series contains a unit root then it will 
be non-stationary and will then need to be 
adjusted, most economic and financial series 
contain a single unit root. For the Augmented 
Dickey Fuller test, the test statistic and the 
critical values are compared to accept or reject 
the null hypothesis that the sets have a unit 
root. If  the t-stat is greater than the critical 
values at the 5% level, then it can be assumed 
with at least a 95% degree of  confidence that 
there is a unit root.
 Table 1 shows the ADF test for the 
Risk Premium series. The test statistic for 
levels is -0.1027, while the 5% critical value 
is -2.9135. The test-statistic is greater than 
the critical value at a 5% confidence interval, 
which means that the null hypothesis is 
not rejected with at least a 95% degree of  
confidence. The dataset has a unit root in 
levels, which means that the dataset must 
be differentiated (using the formula d(Risk_
Premium) in Eviews) to induce stationarity in 
the datasets. Table 1 also shows the ADF tests 
for the other datasets. The Unemployment 
Differential dataset also contains a unit root, 
while the other datasets do not.
 Looking at the first order differences 
(FOD) of  the Risk Premium dataset in Table 
2, the t-stat is -5.5532 while the critical value 
at 5% is -2.9145. In this case the t-stat is 
less than the critical value and thus the null 
hypothesis is rejected. The FOD of  the SDRP 
dataset does not have a unit root. The FOD of  
the other variables was taken and then tested 
for unit roots as well. The ADF test was used 
again on the other three datasets and finds in 
Table 2 that the t-stats are less than the 5% 
critical values. The datasets do not have unit 
roots after taking their first order differences. 
These tests suggest that the datasets are 
now stationary. Another test to ensure this 
assumption is correct is the Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test for stationarity.
 For this test the critical values are 
compared to the test statistic. If  the t-stat is 
greater than the critical value at the 5% level, 
then the null hypothesis is rejected. The null 
hypothesis in this case is that the datasets 
exhibit stationarity. Table 3 shows the KPSS 
tests for stationarity in the FOD of  the four 
datasets. In all four cases the t-stats fall outside 
of  the 10% confidence interval. The t-stats 
are very small, which means that that, with 
absolute certainty, the null hypothesis is not 
rejected. The datasets exhibit stationarity in 
first order differences. 
 To summarize, both the ADF test for 
unit roots and the KPSS test for stationarity 
suggest that the datasets are not stationary 
in levels, but are stationary in first order 
differences. 
Using Eviews to estimate a regression resulted 
in the coefficients in Figure 3.0. After looking 
at multiple lags for the Debt Differential, 
a two-quarter lag showed the greatest 
explanatory power. The hypothesis that the 
Debt and Unemployment Differentials and 
the Growth Gap would be positively related 
to the Risk Premium was correct. This 
reinforces the idea that increases in debt and 
unemployment will increase Spain’s SDRP 
and that a widening GDP growth gap will do 
the same. The sign, magnitude, and statistical 
significance of  each variable, is then analyzed 
individually. The Debt Differential has a lag 
of  2 quarters, whereas the others have none. 
This lag is used to better capture the dynamics 
of  the dataset. After trying out several other 
lags, a lag of  two quarters explained the most 
about the dependent variable. Its coefficient 
is 4.1445 indicating that a 1% increase in the 
Debt Differential will result in a 4.1445% 
increase in the SDRP after two quarters. 
The p-stat shows the probability that the 
coefficient is statistically equal to 0. For this 
variable it is 0.00980 which means that it is 
99% certain that the coefficient is not equal to 
zero. The Growth Gap’s coefficient is 7.6101 
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indicating that a 1% widening of  the Growth 
Gap will result in a 7.6101% increase in the 
SDRP. For this variable the p-stat is 0.0980 
which means that it is only about 90% certain 
that the coefficient is not equal to zero. The 
Unemployment Differential’s coefficient is 
0.2843 indicating that a 1% increase in the 
Unemployment Differential will result in a 
0.28% increase in the SDRP. For this variable 
the p-stat is 0.3875 which means that with no 
certainty is the coefficient not equal to zero. 
The Dummy Variable’s coefficient is 0.1653 
indicating that the recession caused a 16% 
increase in the SDRP. For this variable the 
p-stat is 0.0605 which means that, with almost 
95% certainty, the coefficient is not equal to 
zero. The f-test tests the hypothesis that all of  
the coefficients are equal to 0. The f-statistics 
can be seen at the bottom of  Figure 3.0. The 
f-stat is 3.7216 which is greater than 2 and the 
null hypothesis that the all of  the coefficients 
are statistically equal to 0 is thus rejected. This 
is accomplished with at least 95% certainty 
because the p-value of  the f-stat is 0.0108. 
The adjusted R-squared value is 0.1849 which 
means that the regression can explain 18.49% 
of  the data.
This model was subjected to diagnostic 
checking, to ensure the regression is valid. 
For the purposes of  this paper, three different 
diagnostic checks were used: White’s test 
for homoscedasticity, the Breusch-Godfrey 
test for autocorrelation, and the Jarque-
Bera test for normality of  distribution. The 
desired results for these tests would be to have 
regression residuals that are homoscedastic, 
not autocorrelated, and normally distributed. 
Diagnostic checking tests the reliability of  the 
estimated parameters.
 Table 4.0 shows a condensed version 
of  the results of  the tests. For all of  the tests, 
if  their p-values are greater than .05 then it is 
certain to at least a degree of  95% confidence 
that the null hypothesis is not rejected. For 
White’s test for homoscedacity the p-value 
is 0.5065, which is greater than .05, so 
the null hypothesis that the residuals are 
homoscedastic fails to be rejected. For Breush-
Godfrey’s test for autocorrelation the p-value 
is .5237, which is greater than .05, so the null 
hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation 
fails to be rejected. For the Jarque-Bera test 
for normality of  distribution the p-value is 
.000000, which is much less than .05. This 
means that the null hypothesis that the 
residuals are normally distributed is rejected. 
All but one of  the tests had the desired results 
for reliable parameters except for the Jarque-
Bera test for normality of  distribution. The 
Jarque-Bera test in Figure 3.3 shows that the 
distribution is relatively normal and that it is 
nearly certain that the estimated parameters 
were reliable and gave an acceptable 
R-Squared value despite the Jarque-Bera test 
results.
IV.  Conclusion
 Since the 2008 recession, Spain’s 
economy has been struggling; so much so, that 
the EU agreed to give the country a €37 billion 
bailout in November 2012. The risk premium 
on Spanish debt is an economic indicator 
of  that struggle. As Spain approaches 
economic collapse the risk premium increases 
portraying the risk of  the investment in its 
debt. Spain’s interest rate was compared to 
that of  Germany’s to find the risk premium 
because Germany has a more stable economy. 
To see which variables affect the SDRP a 
time series analysis was applied to certain 
economic indicators’ effect on the SDRP. 
The following data for Spain and Germany 
was gathered from the IMF and Eurostat 
databases: interest rates on government bonds, 
the unemployment level, labor forces, real 
GDPs, and government debts. That data was 
transformed into the Risk Premium, Growth 
Gap, Unemployment Differential, and Debt 
Differential of  the two countries. With the 
data properly transformed the process of  
estimating a model began. Using ADF and 
KPSS tests, the datasets were tested for 
stationarity, with the result that the data is 
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stationary in FOD. With the stationary data, a 
model was estimated and diagnostic checking 
found that the model was homoscedastic, not 
autocorrelated, and normally distributed.
 The Unemployment Differential 
had a large p-stat indicating the coefficient’s 
lack of  significance. This implies that the 
Spanish labor market does not have a 
strong relationship to its financial market. 
The Growth Gap had a p-value too high 
to consider its coefficient significant, but 
low enough that assumptions about the 
Growth Gap’s effect on the SDRP would be 
inconclusive. The Dummy Variable showed 
the positive effect the 2008 recession had 
on Spain’s SDRP, increasing it by 16%. The 
Debt Differential’s coefficient was statistically 
significant and showed that as the differential 
increases, the SDRP increases by 4.1445 times 
more (after a two quarter lag).
 These findings imply that the Debt 
Differential drives the SDRP and that the 
Unemployment Differential does not. The 
2008 recession increased Spain’s SDRP, 
thereby showing the economic indicating 
power of  the SDRP. The findings in this 
paper build on the findings of  Schkneckt et al. 
(2009) and Groba et al. (2013) and Bernoth 
et al. (2012) that macroeconomic indicators 
have an effect on interest rates by showing the 
magnitude of  influence the Debt Differential 
has on SDRP. Possible flaws in this study 
include the lack of  frequency in the data used 
and the few variables that were tested. More 
frequent data would increase the significance 
of  these findings and more variables would 
have been more informative as to the effects of  
macroeconomic indicators on SDRP.
 Possible implications of  this study 
include the Spanish government’s ability 
to better focus recovery efforts on its debt, 
knowing now that the Debt Differential has 
a great effect on its SDRP. The European 
Central Bank, now knowing about the lag 
in the Debt Differential, can anticipate that 
lag when giving out bailouts to countries 
like Spain.  Should Spanish government 
face another recession or other economic 
difficulties, decreasing its debt can help 
to lower its SDRP. The negative effects a 
recession can have on a country’s economy 
are evident in this analysis. The Spanish 
government now knows that once they enter a 
recession, their SDRP will increase and they 
should account for that increase. This study 
could be extended further with the inclusion 
of  more macroeconomic indicators to find 
their magnitudes, doing a similar analysis 
without Germany to see if  those results 
have a higher r-squared, and doing the same 
analysis in a few years to see the effect of  the 
November 2012 bailout on Spain’s SDRP.
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H0: Series has unit 
root
Variables in levels Constant
Risk Premium -0.1027
Debt Differential -4.1589
Growth Gap -5.0391
Unemployment 
Differential
-2.1509
1% Critical Value -3.5504
5% Critical Value -2.9135
10% Critical Value -2.5845
H0: Series has unit 
root
Variables in FOD 
of levels
Constant
Risk Premium -5.5532
Debt Differential -11.8101
Growth Gap -9.5355
Unemployment 
Differential
-10.4788
1% Critical Value -3.5504
5% Critical Value -2.9135
10% Critical Value -2.5845
H0: Series is 
stationary
Variables in FOD 
of levels
Constant
Risk Premium 0.2212
Debt Differential 0.1777
Growth Gap 0.0573
Unemployment 
Differential
0.1480
1% Critical Value 0.7390
5% Critical Value 0.4630
10% Critical Value 0.3470
Variable Coefficient
Constant -0.0004
(-0.0077)
Debt Differential 
(t-2)
4.1445**
(2.7211)
Growth Gap 7.6101
(1.6903)
Unemployment 
Differential
0.2844
(0.8727)
Dummy Variable 0.1653*
(1.9265)
Adjusted R-
Squared
0.1849
F-Statistic 3.7216
Sample Size 49
Appendix
ADF Tests
Table 1 Table 2
Table 3 Table 4
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Test Value P-Value
White 
Statistic
0.9603 0.5065
Breusch-
Godfrey 
Statistic
0.6569 0.5237
Jarque-Bera 
Statistic
39.7081 0.0000
Table 5
Figure 1
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Figure 3
Figure 2
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